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Under the technical direction of the Combat Damage Assessment
Committee (CDAC), the Combat Damage Assessment Team (CDAT) conducted
firings of the A-10/GAU-8 weapon system against individual modern main
battle tanks (MBTs). The test philosophy was one which emphasized em-
pirical realism and the CDAT used actual Soviet T-62 tanks stowed with
90mm TP ammunition, diesel fuel, lubricating oil, and crew mannikins for
the firings. The pilots of the A-10 aircraft used in the test conducted
their attacks at low altitudes and low dive angles simulating approach
and attack below the altitudes of effective engagement for many opposing
air defense networks employing acquisition and fire control radar. The
purpose of the test was to evaluate the lethality of the 30mm APIT ammu-
nition of the GAU-8 guns at low aircraft dive angles against realistic
MBT targets with the pilots using operational tactics and attack modes.
The Combat Damage Assessment Committee assessed the results of the
low angle firings of the A-10 aircraft against the combat loaded T-62
tanks as follows:
1. Attack Parameters : The pilots of the A-10 aircraft attacked
individual Soviet T-62 tanks in five missions totalling seven passes
against two available combat loaded vehicles which were rehabilitated
after each pass. The aircraft were seldom over 200 feet altitude in the
missions and dive angles varied from 1.8 - 4.4° for the measured passes.
The pilots opened fire at slant ranges between 2768-4402 ft. and ceased
fire at ranges between 1587-3055 ft. The burst lengths varied from
120-165 rounds.
2. Weapon Effects : The A-10/GAU-8 weapon systems achieved 93
impacts on six of the seven individual tanks which they attacked (one
firing pass resulted in a miss of the target). The ratio of impacts to
rounds fired was 0.10. The weapon system achieved 17 perforations of the
armored envelopes of the tanks with a ratio of perforations to impacts of
0.18. Many projectiles, which did not perforate armor, severely damaged
exterior suspension components of the tanks. The pilots attacked two of
the tanks directly from the front with negligible weapon effects and this
circumstance should be considered in judging the effectiveness of the
system. The pilots attacked five of the tanks from more favorable side
and rear aspects and achieved all of the perforations at those attack
aspects.
3. Damage Assessment : The A-10/GAU-8 weapon system inflicted three
catastrophic kills through projectile and/or fragment effects against
stowed ammunition. The weapon system inflicted two additional 100% mobili-
ty kills through internal damage to transmissions, fuel tanks and external
damage to track, suspension and drive components. One additional tank was
fired on and missed and one tank suffered negligible damage from frontal
impacts.
1-
4. Test Conditions : Ceiling and visibility were unlimited during
the firing and the target tanks were sited in open, flat.
A
,desert terrain.
Dry weather prevailed prior to the test and much dust were created during
each firing pass by the projectile impacts. Since the pilots made single
passes against individual targets, their accuracy in firing was not
considered to have been significantly affected by the immediate dust.
5. Conclusions :
a. The A-10/GAU-8 firings of 17 February - 10 March 1978 show
that the system has the accuracy and lethality to immobilize or catastro-
phically destroy T-62 tanks in attacks at low altitudes and dive angles.
b. The GAU-8 30mm APIT ammunition fired at low dive angles
(1.8-4.4°) and substantial open fire ranges (4402-2768 ft.) can perforate
the rear and sides of the hull and turrets of the Soviet T-62 tank.
c. The A-10/GAU-8 weapon system can kill Soviet T-62 tanks at
low dive angles in a tactical engagement arc of approximately 210° includ-
ing horizontal attack angles of approximately 75-285°, i.e., both sides
as well as the rear of the Soviet tanks.
d. The tests to date suggest that shorter open fire ranges of
3000-2000 feet with shorter bursts of approximately 50-100 rounds will
result in higher average numbers of impacts, perforation, and kills than
the longer test open fire ranges of approximately 4400-3300 feet and
bursts of 120-140 rounds. The above conclusion is based on the observed
higher percentages of impacts earlier in the long bursts in the test,
greater accuracy of the gun system at closer ranges, and higher terminal
velocities of the kinetic energy ammunition at shorter ranges.
e. The achieved damage levels at low dive angles were as
effective as those obtained earlier using high angle (25-30°) attack
modes during tests conducted in 1975 1 . the firings of 17 February -
10 March 1978 physically demonstrate that attacks by the A-10/GAU-8
system at low dive angles are a viable alternative to the higher angle
attacks used successfully in previous firings. The overall results of
the firings of February and March 1978 are summarized in Table 1.
l See John E. Clemens, A-10 GAU-8 Lethality Tests Against U. S . and
Soviet Armor (University of Dayton, 1977), 88 pp. for the resuts of
the earl ier firings.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Since February 1978, the Armaments Directorate, A-10 Special Project
Office, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, has sponsored a series of
tests using the A-10/GAU-8 system in air-to-ground engagements of armored
targets. These tests have been conducted within the framework of the
GAU-8A 30mm Ammunition Lot Acceptance Verification Program (LAVP) -
Airborne. The LAVP has the following objectives which apply to the
present series of tests:
(1) To evaluate the performance of existing production lots of
GAU-8 ammunition when fired from the air under operational conditions.
(2) To evaluate the lethality of GAU-8 ammunition against specific
threat targets when fired from A-10 aircraft using operational tactics and
known launch parameters.
The mission of the A-10 aircraft is to provide close air support
for U. S. ground forces against a broad spectrum of targets which can be
expected to confront those forces in future conflicts. The most challeng-
ing enemy target within the entire spectrum is probably the main battle
tank (MBT). From the viewpoint of both numbers and qualities, MBTs have
dominated the military landscape in Europe, the Middle ast, and the
Indian Subcontinent since the Second World War. The MBT with its formidible
armor protected firepower, communications, and cross country mobility, and
its ability to mass and disperse quickly makes it the most difficult mobile
target to defeat on the modern battlefield.
In Central Europe, U.S. and other NATO military units are faced with
Soviet and other East European ground forces whose offensive tempo is
geared to the mobility, firepower, and protection afforded by the MBT.
Western forces hold approximately 6000 MBTs and various other ground and
air weapons to resist attack from the East. The problem of defeating
hostile MBTs takes on added significance when one considers that potentially
hostile forces are estimated to have approximately 19,000 tanks available
for the opening stages of a conflict in Central Europe.
The recent USAF firing tests concentrated on attack against the most
challenging target that U. S. and other NATO forces would confront in
Europe - the main battle tank. The USAF conducted the tests at Nell is
Air Force Base, Nevada, between 17 February - 10 March 1978. The tests
comprised low angle passes of the Fairchild Republic A-10A aircraft
firing 30mm APIT projectiles from the internally mounted GAU-8A cannon
against individual Soviet T-62 tanks loaded with ammunition, diesel fuel,
lubricating oil, and crew mannikins. The tests were designed to eval-
uate the low dive angle capabilities of the A-10/GAU-8 weapon system to
damage Soviet MBTs. The attack parameters associated with the test
A-l
involved low altitude, low angle attacks by aircraft flying at high
attack air speeds relative to the maximum performance of the system.
To conduct the present tests, the Armaments Directorate, A-10
Special Project Office, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, has
coordinated extensively with Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Langley,
Virginia, and the Fighter Weapons Center, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.
Within the framework of that cooperation, the Armaments Directorate set up
a Combat Damage Assessment Team (CDAT), which includes civilian contrac-
tors and Nellis Air Force Base range personnel to prepare, execute, and
evaluate the present tests and future similar ones. The CDAT is directed
by a Combat Damage Assessment Committee (CDAC) which has the authority to
influence the technical details of the test and the responsibility for
final evaluation of the results. The CDAC consists of the following
members:
Dr. Russel H. S. Stolfi, Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California (Chairman)
Dr. John E. Clemens, Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio
(Member)
Mr. Raymond R. McEachin, Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus,
Ohio (Member)
The mission of the CDAT is to set up, conduct, analyze, and report
on firings of the A-10/GAU-8 weapon system which (1) subject the ammuni-
tion to conditions adequately simulating actual operations, and (2)
allow for a credible assessment of the weapon effects and damage capabil-
ities of the ammunitions. The firings conducted between 17 February -
10 March 1978 subjected the ammunition to the conditions existing in low
level attacks by A-10 aircraft against actual combat loaded T-62 tanks.
To conduct these firings and similar ones in the future, the CDAT is
organized into the functional groups shown in Chart 1.
The chart shows a loose, functional organization in which a Combat
Damage Assessment Committee coordinates the activities of a Pre-Strike,
Post-Strike, and Analysis and Report Groups. The groups are responsible,
in conjunction with the project officer at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada,
for testing the GAU-8 ammunition. The CDAC felt that for the initial
airborne firings of February - March 1978, the A-10/GAU-8 system should
attack singly at relatively close ranges against systematically oriented
combat loaded T-62 tanks. The CDAC oriented the tanks to collect data
on engagement effectiveness against tanks presenting frontal, side, and
rear aspects to the attacking aircraft.
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CHART NUMBER 1
Organization of the Combat Damage Assessment Team
Combat Damage Assessment Team
(CDAT)
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II. TEST PHILOSOPHY AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The firing tests of 1978 had as their overall purpose to evaluate
the performance of GAU-8 ammunition when fired from the air under opera-
tional conditions and to determine its lethality against specific threat
targets. The test philosophy was one which emphasized physically demon-
strable results achieved under circumstances simulating combat as closely
as practicable. The Armaments Directorate, A-10 Special Project Office,
in turn, would use the demonstrated results to verify the effectiveness
of existing lots of ammunition and effect the appropriate improvements in
ammunition to be produced in the future. Within the overall framework of
empirical reality, the Directorate more specifically sought a test phi-
losophy which would produce credible data and accurate conclusions about
the effectiveness of GAU-8 ammunition fired at low dive angles at Soviet
tanks. To generate credible data, the Directorate decided to use a
technique of destructive testing of actual tank targets proceeding from
firings at individual tanks through firings at tactically arrayed forma-
tions of Soviet or simulated Soviet tanks.
The experimental setup for the firings of 17 February - 10 March
involved the use of two T-62 tanks which were fired at as individual
targets in single passes by attacking aircraft. Earlier ground firing
tests in November 1977, had been conducted as basic data collection
efforts to judge the lethality of the GAU-8 ammunition against the verti-
cal side surfaces of the hull of the Soviet T-62 tanks and side surfaces
of the turrets which would be exposed to impact by projectiles arriving
from A-10 aircraft attacking at low dive angles. The November 1977
firings clearly showed the sensitivity of the Soviet tanks to perforation
and damaging hits when presented in side and rear aspect to aircraft
attacking from open fire engagement ranges of approximately 4000 feet
and less. The impressive weapon effects of the early test encouraged
the CDAT to take a decisive step toward operational realism. The CDAT
and the Armaments Directorate agreed that firings against individual
Soviet tanks systematically sited to present varying aspects and armored
surfaces would (1) yield additional basic data, and (2) involve opera-
tional conditions of actual aircraft flight which would result in a
superior evaluation of the 30mm APIT projectiles being fired.
Warsaw Pact forces in Europe would probably employ several differ-
ent MBT models as part of an attack into West Germany. The elite Group
of Soviet Forces, Germany, would employ a mix of T-72, T-64 and T-62
tanks, while the remaining Pact countries would probably employ a mix
of T-62 and the aging T-55 tanks. At present, the potential attacking
Pact forces in Central Europe probably have a majority of T-62 tanks,
and a significant, rapidly increasing number of T-64 and T-72 vehicles.
The most effective targets to represent Soviet tanks would be either
T-64 or T-72 tanks. The U. S. has not been able to acquire either a
T-64 or T-72 tank, however a T-62 tank was available and was used as
a target for the destructive testing.
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The Soviet T-62A tank (Fig. 1) represents the greatest ground
threat to U.S. forces in Europe in terms of numbers available to the
Soviet units which would initially be committed to combat in a future war
in Europe. The performance characteristics of this tank can be found in
several classified and unclassified references,.
Two T-62 tanks were available for use as targets. These tanks
were rehabilitated to a level suitable to the collection and assessment
of weapons effects and lethality data. The rehabilitation required that
the on-board vulnerability critical components be simulated in order to
meet test requirements for a "combat configured" tank. The critical
components were considered to be stowed ammunition, fuel and oil, and
crew personnel. These items were simulated as follows:
Personnel -- Mannikins constructed of 1/2" plywood and
articulated at the joints to allow a reason-
able representation of personnel in a combat
posture.
Fuel Tanks -- Five-gallon military type gas cans filled
with D-2 diesel fuel
.
Ammunition -- U.S. Cartridge, 90mm, TP-T.
Oil Tanks -- Five-gallon military type liquid containers
filled with engine-type lubricating oil.
The ammunition, oil, and fuel were placed within the tank hull in
locations approximating as closely as possible their original position.
Figure 2 is a sketch showing the location of fuel and ammunition. The
mannequins were placed at crew stations in positions approximating the
combat posture of crew personnel in closed hatch operations.
Figures 3 and 4 are photographs of the simulated ammunition and
fuel stowage in the hull and turret. For Mission 1, the racks shown for
stacking ammunition (notched 2" x 6" boards) were not available, and the
appropriate number of rounds were stacked on ammunition boxes. For the
remaining Missions 2-5, the CDAT used the wooden racks shown in
Fig. 3" and 4.
The precise configuration of targets prior to each mission is
presented in the Low Angle Strafe Demonstration Test Report, which was
completed by the pre-strike field test survey group at Burlington,
Vermont, after the completion of the firings. The targets were suitable
for collection and assessment of weapons effects and lethality data of
the type which represented the main thrust of the ammunition firing.
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It can be asserted with a high degree of confidence that:
The armor of the target tanks was intact for test purposes (only
one projectile penetrated through previously made holes) and provided
afairtest of the penetrating capabilities of GAU-8/A projectiles
under the existing conditions.
Given a perforation of the armored envelope, the simulations provided
the means to demonstrate that the GAU-8/A projectile retained or did
not retain sufficient velocity to damage critical components behind
the plate through dynamic interactions between critical sensitive com-




































Fig 2. Locations of Fuel and Ammunition in Target Tanks
A-
8
Fig 3. Simulated Bow Racks and Fuel Tank
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Fig 4. Simulated Fuel Tank and Rear Fighting Compartment Ammunition Stowage
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III. DEFINITIONS
The terms used in Section IV - WEAPON EFFECTS AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, are
defined below:
IMPACT -- Any evidence of a projectile strike against any portion of the
target. Ground ricochets striking the target were classified as
"impacts".
PERFORATION -- Any rupture of the armored envelope caused by an impact-
ing projectile which results in behind-the-plate effects by the pro-
jectile or spall fragments. A perforation can occur only when the armor
is impacted. The word "Perforation" was deliberately selected to avoid
the ambiguities which may occur through use of the word "penetration".
HIT -- Any impact not classified as a perforation.
MOBILITY KILL (M-KILL) -- Loss of tactical mobility resulting from damage
which cannot be repaired by the crew on the battlefield. A tank is
considered to have sustained an M-Kill when it is no longer capable of
executing controlled movement on the battlefield. Mobility is DEGRADED
when a tank can no longer maintain its position in the formation of
which it is a part.
FIREPOWER KILL (F-KILL) — Loss of tactical firepower resulting from
damage which cannot be repaired by the crew on the battlefield. A
tank is considered to have sustained an F- Kill when it is incapable of
delivering controlled fire from its main armament . Firepower is
DEGRADED when a tank can no longer maintain its "normal" rate-of-fire,
velocity, accuracy, time to shift targets, etc.
CATASTROPHIC KILL (K-KILL) -- A tank is considered to have sustained a
K- Kill when both an M-Kill and a K-Kill have occurred as the result of
killing fires and explosions from ignited fuel and/or ammunition. A
tank which has suffered a K-Kill is considered not to be economically
repairable, and by U.S. standards, would be abandoned on the battlefield.
ATTACK AZIMUTH -- The angle of approach of the aircraft with respect to
the orientation of the target with 0° representing the front of the
tank (gun forward) and 180° representing the rear of the tank.
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IV. WEAPON EFFECTS AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
The test series consisted of five test missions which involved
seven aircraft passes against two T-62 tank targets. Hits were scored
on each pass except one (Mission 4, Target 18), resulting in a total
of 18 projectile perforations into the armored envelope out of 104 im-
pacts. A total of 957 rounds was expended during the test. These data





TARGET 13 (T-62 TANK) TARGET 18 (T-62 TANK)
Misses Hits Perfs
Total

































The CDAT, Post Strike Group, collected data on site as soon as
possible after each mission. This included range, aircraft, ammunition,
gun, and target data and was documented to the extent possible by gun,
phototheodolite, and remote ground cameras. These data have been col-
lated, analyzed, and published by the Analysis and Report Group led by
Dr. E. R. Terry and published in Gravois, Graham, Neuer, and Gadecki;
Final Report on the Results of the Nell is A-10A Low Angle Strafe
Demonstration Tests Conducted During the Period of 17 February
10 March 1978 (General Electric, Burlington, Vermont, 21 Sep 1 978),
pp 273.
The Combat Damage Assessment Committee (CDAC) through the CDAT was
responsible for assessing the damage resulting from each mission and
assigning a kill factor according to the terms referenced in Section III
This damage was assessed based on observation of the tests, field notes
(data sheets) recorded on-site, study of the photography, de-briefings
of the test pilots (66th Fighter Weapons Squadron), and the report













1 13 180° 100%
2 13 180° 100%
18 90° 100% 95%
3 18 90° 100% 60%
4 13 155° 100%
18 0° Not assessed--no projectile impacts on
target.
5
2 > 18 0° No significant damage.
1) Planned attack aspect
^o
2) Mission 5 was essentially a repeat of the attack azimuth of
Mission 4.
The damage sustained by each target and the rationale behind the
above assessments are discussed below on a mission-by-mission basis:
Mission 1, Target13, 17 February 1978 (See Illustration 1)
This target was assessed as an immedia
perforation (impact No. 1) of the rear turre
likely cause of the catastrophic damage was
occurred approximately 0.39 seconds into the
the tank. The location of the strike (Fig.
probable cause of the explosion was the impa
jectile, or spall fragments, against a singl
stowed slightly right of center in the rear
the turret ring (see Fig. 2). The target wa
projectiles which caused insignificant damag
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?ln?r UPru 1ew 0f Impact ] ' Missi'on 1, Target 13(NOTE: The rectangular hole to the right
of the perforation was occasioned by removal
of the armor for hardness testing. The patch
over the hole was blown outward by the inter-
nal explosion and showed no evidence of other
impacts.)
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Mission 2, Target 13, 24 February 1978 (See Illustration 2)
This target was assessed as an immediate K-Kill, resulting from a
single perforation of the rear turret armor (Fig. 7). The most likely
cause of the kill was an internal explosion which occurred approximately
.62 seconds into the burst, probably occasioned by perforation of the
armor from impact 1, which occurred .29 seconds into the burst. The
location of the strike indicates that the most probable cause of the ex-
plosion was impaction of the penetrating projectile, or spall fragments,
into a single round of ammunition stowed in the rear of the turret (see
Fig. 2). The armored envelope of this target was perforated by two other
projectiles, impact 5 (Fig. 8) and impact 6 (Fig. 9).
Impact 5 completely penetrated an 8" x 8" timber (used to simulate
a deditching log) and perforated the right transmission inspection plate
(Fig. 10). The projectile damaged the fan housing and flange causing a
100 percent loss of function to the cooling fan. In the absence of a
K-Kill, this damage alone would have resulted in an interdiction type
mobility kill occasioned by engine overheating.
Impact 6 perforated the left rear engine grille and grille cover
with no behind plate effects. The trajectory (Fig. 9) indicated that
the projectile continued to impact and dislodge an expedient honeycomb
patch over a rectangular hole in the rear of the turret where armor had
been removed for analysis (Fig. 11). It was the judgment of the on-site
CDAT team that this projectile probably would not have perforated clean
armor but if it had, would probably have resulted in a K-Kill due to
possible impact on the round of ammunition stowed in the rear of the
turret (see Fig. 2). The ambiguities associated with this judgment were
resolved by film analysis which showed that the perforation of the turret
(Impact 1, Fig. 7), and the internal explosion, occurred prior to impact
6 on the engine grille cover.
Significant damage was caused by one additional impact (Impact 11,
Fig. 12) which penetrated into the right track drive sprocket, cracking
the hub and causing loss of oil and severe damage to the bearings. In
the absence of a K-Kill, this damage alone was sufficient to cause a
100 percent mobility kill. However, the reader should be cautioned that
the track, which would have shielded the sprocket from this impact, was
not in place. If it had been, different results may have been recorded.
The target was impacted by eleven other projectiles which caused
insignificant damage and made no contribution to the assessed kill.
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ILLUSTRATION 2
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Fig 7. Location of Strike, Impact 1, Mission 2, Target 13
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Fig 8. Location of Strike, Impact 5, Mission 2, Target 13
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Fig 9. Location of Strike, Impact 6, Mission 2, Target 13
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Fig 10. Location of Strike, Impact 5, Mission 2, Target 13
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Fig 11. Location of Honeycomb Patch Dislodged by Impact 6
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i i y i e. uamaye tu mynt iracK unve Sprocket
Caused by Impact 11 (Mission 2, Target 13)
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Mission 2, Target 18, 24 February 1978 (See Illustration 3)
This target was impacted by 21 projectiles of which four caused
significant damage. These impacts (numbers 5, 8, 9 and 17) are shown
in Fig. 13.
Impact number five perforated the loader's periscope housing
(Fig. 14). The projectile and/or spall fragments continued through the
fighting compartment to the opposite side of the turret and damaged two
mannlkins representing the gunner and tank commander. The mannikin
at the gunner's station received projectile and/or spall damage in the
left shoulder area, and to the right side of the head as shown in Fig.
15 and was assessed as killed in action (KIA). The mannikin represent-
ing the tank commander (Fig. 16) was damaged in the left shoulder area
and was assessed as wounded in action (WIA). Based on these two casual-
ties, an F-Kill of 95 percent was assessed.
Impact 17 (Fig. 17) perforated the right front side hull armor
immediately in front of the number 2 road wheel and ruptured five of
the 16 five-gallon fuel cans simulating the bow fuel tank. Figs. 18
through 22 show spall fragment perforations in the fuel cans. A mobil-
ity kill was assessed based on a judgment by the CDAT that a ruptured
bow fuel tank, together with two crew casualties, would render the tank
ineffective for combat. The tank was accorded the capability of moving
a short distance to a covered and/or concealed position, or to a main-
tenance area, for repairs.
Impacts 8 and 9 (Figs. 23 and 24 respectively) penetrated the right
front external fender mounted fuel tank causing a 100 percent loss of
function. These impacts were assessed as contributing to the mobility
kill.
The target was impacted by 17 other projectiles which caused
insignificant damage and made no contribution to the assessed kill.
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Fig 13. Location of Significant Impacts, Mission 2, Target 18
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Fig 14. Close-up View of Perforation Through Loaders
Periscope Housing, Mission 2, Target 18
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Fig 15. Projectile and/or Spall Damage to Mannikin
at Gunner's Station (Impact 5, Mission 2,
Target 18)
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Fig 16. Projectile and/or Spall Damage to Mannikin
at Commander's Station (Impact 5, Mission 2,
Target 18)
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Fig 17. Perforation of Right Side Hull Armor
(Part of Projectile Remains in Hole),
Mission 2, Target 18
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Fig 18. Perforation of Fuel Can Simulating
Bow Fuel Tank, Impact 17, Mission 2,
Target 18 (NOTE: This impact is mis-
numbered and should read 17.)
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Fig 19. Perforation of Fuel Can Simulating Bow
Fuel Tank, Impact 17, Mission 2, Target 18
(NOTE: This impact is mis-numbered and
should read 17. )
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Fig 20. Perforation of Fuel Can Simulating Bow
Fuel Tank, Impact 17, Mission 2, Target 18
(NOTE: This impact is mis-numbered and
should read 17. )
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Fig 21. Perforation of Fuel Can Simulating Bow
Fuel Tank, Impact 17, Mission 2, Target
18 (NOTE: This impact is mis-numbered
and should read 17. )
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Fig 22. Perforation of Fuel Can Simulating Bow
Fuel Tank, Impact 17, Mission 2, Target
18 (NOTE: This impact is mis-numbered
and should read 17.
)
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Fig 23 Perforation of External Fuel Tank






Fig 24. Perforation of External Fuel Tank
by Impact 9, Mission 2, Target 18
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Mission 3, Target 18, 2 March 1978 (See Illustration 4)
This target was impacted by 16 projectiles, resulting in one per-
foration and seven other hits causing significant firepower and mobility
related damage.
Impact 2 (Fig. 25) perforated the right side hull armor just above
the number four road wheel. Projectile and/or spall fragments damaged
the left hand and thigh area of the mannequin at the tank commander's
station (Fig. 26), a round of ammunition in the fighting compartment
stowage area (Fig. 27), and a round of ammunition in the bow storage area
(Fig. 28). The tank commander was assessed a casualty (WIA) and a 50
percent F-Kill assigned. No contribution to the kill was assessed due
to the fragment damaged ammunition; however, the damage was interesting
because it was the widest distribution of fairly large fragments noted
in this series of tests.
Impact 15 (Fig. 29) penetrated one wall of the gun tube and was
assessed as a 10 percent contribution to the F-Kill. This assessment
was based on tactical considerations and the CDAT's perceptions of crew
attitudes based on damage to the gun tube alone. It was the CDAT's
judgment that the crew would avoid firing chemical energy type rounds
such as high explosive anti-tank munitions (HEAT) due to the possibility
of premature functioning of the projectile due to gun tube damage.
However, it was also considered that during an active engagement against
ground targets dangerous to tanks they could, and probably would continue
to fire kinetic energy (armor piercing) rounds with some loss in accuracy
and range which could be compensated for to some extent by gunnery
techniques.
A 100 percent M-Kill was assessed due to the following damage:
Impact 3 (Fig. 30) -- Spall from impact on the intermediate track
cover perforated the right rear externally mounted fuel cell causing a
100 percent loss of function to the fuel cell.
Impact 10 (Fig. 31
)
-- Penetrated hub of right No. 1 road wheel
causing 100 percent loss of function of the road wheel.
Impacts 11, 12, 13 and 14 (Fig. 32) -- Penetrated or damaged the
right idler wheel. Impacts 11 and 13 both caused damage sufficient to
result in a 100 percent loss of function to the idler wheel. Impact 12
split the idler wheel rim sufficiently to cause a 10 percent contribution
to an M-Kill if considered alone. Impact 14 impacted the idler wheel
rim causing negligible damage; however, the track was net in place. If
the track had been in place it would have been damaged to an indeterminable
extent.
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The target was impacted by eight other projectiles which caused
insignificant damage and made no contribution to the assessed kill, which
overall was assessed as:
Mission 3, Target 18
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Fig 25. Location of Strike, Impact 2, Mission 3,
Target 18
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Fig 26. Damaged Left Hand and Thigh Area of
Mannikin at Commander's Station
(Impact 2, Mission 3, Target 18)
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Fig 27. Fragment Damage to Round of Ammunition
in Fighting Compartment Stowage Area
(Impact 2, Mission 3, Target 18)
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Fig 28. Fragment Damage to Round of Ammunition
in Bow Stowage Area (Impact 2, Mission 3,
Target 18)
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Fig 29. Penetrated Wall of Gun Tube
Impact 15, Mission 3, Target 18
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Fig 30. Impact 3, Mission 3, Target 18 Causing Spalling
Which Perforated the Right Rear Externally Mounted
Fuel Cell
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Fig 31. Impact 10, Mission 3, Target 18
Showing Damage to Right No. 1
Road Wheel
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Fig 32. Impacts 11, 12, 13 and 14 Showing
Damage to Right Idler Wheel
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Mission 4, Target 18, 8 March 1978
No hits were scored on Target 18 during Mission 4. The target was
assessed as retaining 100 percent of its inherent mobility and firepower.
Mission 4, Target 13, 8 March 1978 (See Illustration 5)
This target was impacted by 32 projectiles of which 11 perforated
the armored envelope. Of the 11 perforations, Impacts 1 , 2, 3 and 4
(Fig. 33) perforated the right rear turret area and entered the fighting
compartment. Either of these projectiles, all of which occurred between
and .57 seconds into the burst, was capable of behind-the-plate effects
resulting in a catastrophic kill. A 100 percent K-Kill was assessed
based on damage resulting from impacts 2, 3 and 4. Impacts 9 and 10
(Fig. 34) and 13 (Fig. 35) perforated the engine compartment. A high
probability of damage to mobility related components was associated with
impacts 9 and 13. The remaining perforations (impacts 11, 12, 14 and 15
(Fig. 36) caused insignificant or no damage behind the plate.
Impacts 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 30, 31 and 33 caused insignificant
mobility related damage as follows:
Impact 21 (Figs. 37 and 38) -- Knocked off one tooth of right track
drive sprocket and penetrated the right number four road wheel. A 10
percent loss of function to the drive sprocket was assessed.
Impacts 22, 23, 24 and 33 (Figs. 37, 39 and 40) -- Penetrated the
right number four road wheel hub (Impact 23), split and deformed the
outside road wheel (Impact 33), and split the outside road wheel on the
opposite side of the wheel from Impact 33 (Impact 22). A 100 percent
loss of function to the road wheel was assessed.
Impacts 29, 30 and 31 (Fig. 41) -- Broke out a 10" section of the
right number one road wheel with an assessed loss of function of 100
percent.
The target was impacted by 13 other projectiles which caused
insignificant damage and made no contribution to the assessed kill.
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Fig 33. Perforations of the Fighting Compartment,
Impacts 1, 2, 3 and 4, Mission 4, Target 13
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Fig 34. Perforations of the Engine Compartment,
Impacts 9 and 10, Mission 4, Target 13
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Fig 35 Perforation of the Engine
Compartment,
Impact 13, Mission 4, Target 13.
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Fig 36. Perforations of the Armored Envelope
Causing Insignificant Damage, Impacts
11, 12, 14 and 15, Mission 4, Target 13
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Fig 37. Damage to Right Track Drive Sprocket
and Number 4 Roadwheel , Impacts 21,
22, 23 and 24, Mission 4, Target 13
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Fig 38. Close-up of Missing Sprocket Tooth,
Impact 21, Mission 4, Target 13
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Fig 39. Damage to Right Number 4 Road Wheel
Impact 23, Mission 4, Target 13
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Fig 40. Damage to Right Number 4 Road Wheel,
Impact 33, Mission 4, Target 13
^vss
Fig 41. Damage to Right Number 2 Road Wheel,
Impacts 29, 30 and 31, Mission 4,
Target 13
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Mission 5, Target 18, 10 March 1978 (See Illustration 6)
This target was hit once on the turret, three times on the upper
sloping (glacis) plate, and three times on non-armored components, for
a total of seven impacts (Fig. 42).
None of the impacts resulted in a perforation. All impacts on
armor were at high obliquities which gouged the armor, but with no
behind-the-plate effects. Impact 1 against the turret and Impacts 3, 4
and 5 against the upward sloping (glacis) plate are shown close-up in
Figs. 43, 44, 45 and 46 respectively. No degradation of firepower was
assessed.
Hits 6 and 7 (Fig. 42) impacted the left front fender of the
target and the hole characteristics indicated a ground ricochet in both
cases. Close inspection of the idler wheel revealed no damage. While
the track was not installed the damage assessment indicated that if the
track had been installed it would have remained intact with no degrada-
tion of mobil ity.
Hit number 2 was the only potentially significant impact. The
characteristics of this hole also indicated a ground ricochet, but one
with sufficient stability and velocity to penetrate the idler wheel rim
before dissipating against the idler spindle housing flange without
further damage (Fig. 47). The track was not installed. Had the track
been installed, it would have been impacted first and may or may not
have been significantly damaged. While recognizing the possibility of
a partial or complete mobility kill due to a broken track, the CDAT,
in the absence of on-site evidence to the contrary, elected to assess no
degradation in mobility resulting from this hit. This judgment was
based on characteristics of the hole and previous CDAT experience with
small holes in steel waffle type track.
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A-IO/GAU-8 LOW ANGLE FIRINGS
VERSUS INDIVIDUAL SOVIET TANKS























I NO TSPI DATA WERE AVAILABLE FOR MISSION 5, PASS 1
A-62
Fig 42 Location of
Strikes, Impacts 1 through
7,
Mission 5, Target 18
Fig 43. Close-up of Impact 1, Mission 5,
Target 18
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Fig 44. Close-up of Impact 3, Mission 5,
Target 18
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Fig 45. Close-up of Impact 4, Mission 5,
Target 18
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Fig 46. Close-up of Impact 5, Mission 5,
Target 18
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:Fig 47. Close-up of Impact 2, Mission 5,
Target 18
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Working within the framework of the Lot Acceptance Verification
Program (LAVP) of the Armaments Directorate, A-10 System Program Office,
and on the basis of general cooperation between the Systems and Tactical
Air Commands, USAF, pilots of the 66th Fighter Weapons Squadron,
Nell is AFB, Nevada, attacked individually sited Soviet T-62 tanks during
the period 17 February - 10 March 1978. Two T-62 tanks were used as
targets for the tests and were loaded with 90mm TP ammunition, diesel
fuel, lubricating oil, and crew mannikins. The purpose of the tests
was to evaluate the performance of GAU-8 ammunition when fired from the
air under operational conditions and to evaluate its lethality at low
dive angles against Soviet tanks. The low altitude attacks were intended
to simulate evasion of a radar controlled air defense network. The test
philosophy was one of live firing against combat loaded MBTs in order to
assess weapon effects and damage on the basis of observed results against
actual damaged targets.
The pilots achieved 93 impacts in six out of the total of seven
firing passes in the tests. Seventeen of the impacts on the tanks
perforated the armored envelopes and contributed in varying degrees to
catastrophic damage on the perforated tanks. Seventy-six of the impacts
on the tanks failed to perforate, but a significant number of these
impacts effected mobility and firepower type damage on five out of the
total of seven tanks significantly damaged in the tests. Both the bal-
listic performance of the GAU-8 ammunition and its lethality must be
measured in terms of damage inflicted on realistic targets, and Figure 3
below summarizes the tests in terms of damage inflicted on the combat
loaded T-62 targets:
Table IV
A-10/GAU-8 System Damage Analysis
Seven Passes Versus Seven T-62 Tanks
Kill/Damage Ratio Number Passes
Kills Per Pass at Attack Aspect
K-Kill/Catastrophic Damage 0.43 2 at 180° (Rear)
1 at 155° (Rear)
M-Ki 11 /Mobility Damage
F-Ki 11 /Firepower Damage
M & F Kill /Balanced M & F Damage
Insignificant or No Damage
Totals 0.71 Overall 7 at Various Aspects
0.14 1 at 90° (Rear)
0.00
0.14 1 at 90° (Rt Side)
0.00 2 at 0° (Front)
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The table shows that the ratio of catastrophic kills per pass was
a substantial 0.43. The ratio of all types of kills per pass, inclu-
ding K, M, F, and M&F kills, was 0.71. The two low angle attacks against
frontal aspects of the T-62 tanks resulted in insignificant damage to
the targets. In one of the passes, the pilot missed the target and
inflicted no damage; in the other, the pilot impacted the target seven
times and inflicted insignificant damage. The fronts of the hulls and
turrets of Soviet T-62 and other similar tanks present well sloped and
thick armor whose main strength is the defeat of kinetic energy projec-
tiles. In low angle passes by aircraft with 30mm AP ammunition against
such targets, the probability of a kill from the front is low and depends
on (1) synergistic effects on the front track and idler wheels, (2)
perforations through the walls of the gun tube, and (3) perforations
through vision apertures, hatches, and similar surfaces. The chances
of the above effects taking place are increased by short range attacks
which raise the number of impacts on target because of the improved
accuracy of the gun system at short ranges, and an increase in the
number of perforations because of the higher terminal velocities of the
projectiles.
The target tanks were arranged systematically in the tests to
present certain technically and tactically significant aspects to the
attacking aircraft, e.g., front, side, and rear surfaces. Although the
firings were conducted at long open fire ranges of up to 4,400 feet,
the observed weapon effects and damage were severe on the side and rear
surfaces of the hulls and turrets. The shorter range attacks from the
front of the tanks during which seven projectiles were placed on target
resulted in insignificant damage. The small overall data sample - 7
passes, 6 tanks impacted, 957 rounds fired, 93 impacts, and 17 perfora-
tions - makes it difficult to generalize extensively about the perfor-
mance of the ammunition and the lethality of the projectiles. The test
data support a view that the 30mm APIT ammunition is effective against
combat loaded Soviet T-62 tanks when fired at low dive angles and
moderate to long open fire ranges.
The test data, other similar data, and combat results since the
Second World War, point toward the generalization from a technical
viewpoint that modern MBTs are susceptible to catastrophic damage from
30mm - 37mm aircraft fired projectiles against side, rear, and top
surfaces. The CDAC recommends that future A-10/GAU-8 tests include
emphasis on short range attacks against the sides of MBTs to gauge the
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